Other petitioners' cases were later consolidated with this petition. These include the cases of Redha al Najar, a Tunisian citizen, who alleges capture in Pakistan, and Amin al Bakri, a Yemeni citizen, who claims he was arrested while on a business trip to Thailand. 4 Both allege that they were captured in 2002, 5 and they filed habeas corpus petitions in 2008. 6 Significantly, all three detainees claimed they were captured outside Afghanistan-away from any battlefield-and had been extraordinarily rendered to Bagram to face indefinite and prolonged detention. 7 The U.S. Government moved to dismiss these petitions for lack of jurisdiction under the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). 8 the 2008 case Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court held the MCA unconstitutional for suspending the writ of habeas corpus to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 9 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion set forth a three-factor test to determine the reach of the Suspension Clause as applicable to detainees held outside U.S. territory. 10 These factors are:
(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites of where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ. 11 The principal question presented in the Al Maqaleh litigationwhether the Suspension Clause reached petitioners at Bagramturned on the interpretation and application of this three-factor test. In 2009, Judge John D. Bates of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued the first major opinion in Al Maqaleh. 12 It focused on the jurisdictional question as to whether the Suspension Clause applied to detainees at Bagram. Concluding that the Bagram petitioners "are virtually identical" to detainees in Guantanamo under the Boumediene factors, Judge Bates dismissed the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 13 In May 2010, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously reversed. 14 Then-Chief Judge David B. Sentelle interpreted the second factor (site of apprehension and detention) and the third (practical obstacles) "overwhelmingly in favor" of the United States to dismiss the petitions. 15 The petitioners then returned to the District Court to present amended petitions containing new evidence that they argued would tip the Boumediene analysis in their favor. 16 The District Court, bound by the D.C. Circuit's decision, construed the Boumediene factors narrowly and dismissed the amended petitions. 17 The D.C. Circuit upheld this decision in (another) unanimous opinion (2006) , which held that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 did not apply to cases pending before Article III courts. The MCA retroactively applied these DTA provisions to all pending cases. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008) (" [T] he MCA was a direct response to Hamdan's holding that the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping provision had no application to pending cases."). 9. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723. 10. The Suspension Clause provides, "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. authored by Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson. 18 Petitioners then filed a writ of certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2014. 19 When the justices reached the case, however, none of the petitioners was in U.S. custody. 20 The Supreme Court therefore dismissed their petitions as moot and vacated the judgment of the D.C. Circuit. 21 This Article examines the legal landscape surrounding the extraterritorial reach of the writ of habeas corpus following the Supreme Court's disposition of Al Maqaleh. It argues that the two D.C. Circuit opinions in this case misconstrued Supreme Court precedent and reached erroneous conclusions. On three issues in particular, the D.C. Circuit's legal conclusions are flawed.
First, the court misinterpreted the second Boumediene factor, which pertains to the site of apprehension and site of detention. Both D.C. Circuit opinions focus exclusively on the site of detention, ignoring the fact that all three of these detainees claim to have been apprehended outside Afghanistan and extraordinarily rendered to Bagram. Moreover, the court misread Eisentrager, a 1950 Supreme Court case considering the writ of habeas corpus in the context of German nationals detained following World War II, and Boumediene to confer primacy on U.S. sovereignty over the detention facility. 22 This marginalizes other aspects of the Boumediene three-factor analysis such as the objective degree of control over the facility and the indefinite nature of petitioners' detention.
Second, the D.C. Circuit misconstrued the practical obstacles factor as a separation of powers issue as opposed to a functional concern with extending the writ to Bagram. Judge Henderson's opinion for the D.C. Circuit is especially problematic in this regard. 23 Third, and most worrisome, both D.C. Circuit opinions dismiss (without serious consideration) petitioners' claim that the Executive manipulated the site of detention-by choosing to hold petitioners at Bagram rather than at Guantanamo Bay-to escape the reach of habeas corpus. 24 A Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the CIA's detention and interrogation program published in December 2014 subsequently confirmed that senior officials in the Bush Administration ordered detainee transfers specifically to avoid habeas jurisdiction. 25 For these reasons, this Article argues that it is crucial that Al Maqaleh be abrogated. Al Maqaleh should not bind future courts tackling the difficult questions of how far and to whom the writ of habeas corpus should reach.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II provides factual background and a detailed summary of the major opinions in the Al Maqaleh litigation. Part III examines the site of apprehension prong of the Boumediene factors and argues that it should have played a more substantial role in the D.C. Circuit's jurisdictional analysis. It also critically examines the D.C. Circuit's formalistic approach to the site-of-detention factor. Part IV looks at the practical obstacles factor, tracing its development from Eisentrager through Boumediene. Part V looks at executive manipulation of writ jurisdiction and explains the gradual shift from Guantanamo Bay to Bagram Air Base as the principal detention site-a shift motivated, at least in part, by a desire to evade habeas corpus. The Article concludes that Al Maqaleh has unconstitutionally altered Boumediene's test for the extraterritorial application of habeas corpus by empowering the Executive to "switch the Constitution on or off at will." 26
II. AL MAQALEH: BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Facts of the Case
The petitioners in the Al Maqaleh litigation all alleged similar facts. Fadi al Maqaleh, a citizen of Yemen, was captured outside Afghanistan in approximately 2003. 27 Because Bagram detainees did not have access to counsel, the exact details of his arrest and detention are not known. Al Maqaleh's family only discovered that he was in U.S. custody through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 28 In a letter to his father, al Maqaleh stated that he was U.S. 33 His petition alleges that plain-clothed Pakistani and French men took him from his home, in front of his wife and children. 34 The petition further alleges that, following his arrest, al Najar was "disappeared" for approximately one and a half years. 35 In this period, he claims to have been placed in one or more CIA "black sites" and, like al Maqaleh, subjected to torture and other unlawful interrogation techniques. 36 Amin al Bakri is a Yemeni citizen. 37 His petition alleges capture in Bangkok, Thailand on or around December 30, 2002. 38 It further alleges that he was a precious stones and shrimps merchant on a business trip when he was "disappeared by the United States." 39 Al Bakri's fate was unknown to his family until six months after his disappearance. At that time, they received a postcard through the ICRC in his handwriting informing them that he was detained in Bagram. 40 In that six-month period, the petition claims that al Bakri suffered injuries and serious abuse in CIA "black sites." 41 It is worth noting some important similarities among the three petitioners. First, all three allege that they were captured outside Afghanistan, away from any battlefield, and that none of the petitioners are citizens of Afghanistan. Second, they were all held virtually incommunicado at Bagram. Despite numerous requests from their U.S.-based attorneys, petitioners were never allowed to meet with or even speak on the telephone with legal counsel. 42 As a result, petitioners' attorneys never operated with a full account of the factual circumstances surrounding their capture and detention. What little information emerged about their situation was pieced together from communications with family members. Through the ICRC, petitioners were periodically allowed to send messages and speak on the phone with their families. 43 Third, and most disturbingly, all these petitioners claim to have endured torture and other cruel, unusual, and degrading treatment in contravention of international law both at CIA "black sites" and at Bagram. 44
Second Amended
B. The Four Major Opinions
Al Maqaleh I
In April 2009, Judge Bates of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued the first major decision in the Al Maqaleh litigation ("Al Maqaleh I"). 45 His memorandum opinion ruled on the Government's motion to dismiss the consolidated habeas petitions for lack of jurisdiction. In this procedural posture, petitioners had the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction, but their petitions would be construed liberally with all factual inferences weighed in their favor. 46 The principal issue for the court was whether the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution applied to detainees at Bagram Air Base. 47 Judge Bates's opinion begins with a detailed overview of precedents pertaining to the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause. 48 Boumediene is unique. As he put it, "[N]o case was so on point as to allow the [Boumediene] Court simply to apply established precedent. Instead, the Court constructed a new framework to address the specific question it faced." 49 The specific question in Boumediene, according to Judge Bates, "is no different" from the issue posed in Al Maqaleh, and therefore "the analysis . . . must focus first and foremost on Boumediene." 50 In Boumediene, the Supreme Court held that section 7 of the MCA, which stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions from detainees at Guantanamo Bay, was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. 51 The court noted, "[A]t least three factors are relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause." 52 Judge Bates subdivided them into six factors:
(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the detainee; (3) the adequacy of the process through which the status determination was made; (4) the nature of the site of apprehension; (5) the nature and site of detention; and (6) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner's entitlement to the writ. 53 As a threshold matter, Judge Bates had to decide whether the Boumediene factors should be applied categorically to all detainees. 54 This is what the Government proposed. In its view, for instance, the site of apprehension factor turned only on whether detainees were captured in American territory; if they were not, the Court should end its inquiry and construe that factor in the Government's favor. 55 Judge Bates rejected this categorical approach because, in his view, "Boumediene contemplated a more nuanced analysis" that focused on "objective factors and practical concerns." 56 Crucially, he noted that the Government's approach could have problematic consequences. It would allow the executive to "switch the Constitution on or off at will" and therefore nullify one of the core purposes of the writ-to provide a judicial check on executive detention practices. 57 In this vein, Judge Bates proposed a seventh factor: the period of detention without adequate review. 58 He noted that, as of 2009, petitioners had all been detained for more than six years and therefore "whatever 'reasonable period of time' the Executive was entitled had long since passed. In applying the Boumediene factors, Judge Bates carefully weighed the competing arguments on both sides. With respect to citizenship, the fact that none of the petitioners were U.S. citizens weighed against them, just as it did with the Boumediene petitioners. 60 Petitioners argued that the court should further make the distinction between citizens of friendly and belligerent nations. 61 Hence, the fact that petitioners were Yemeni and Tunisian-and not Afghan or Iraqi-should be construed in their favor. Judge Bates rejected this approach on the grounds that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) applied to a terrorist "enemy" more broadly (including organizations or persons) and not to specific nations. 62 The "status of the detainee" factor did not clearly favor either side. 63 However, Judge Bates found that petitioners' "enemy combatant" designation was so broad that it required "meaningful process" to ensure that they were not improperly classified. 64 The process afforded to Bagram detainees at the time was the Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board (UECRB). 65 Comprised of three commissioned officers, the UECRB reviewed every detainee's status within seventy-five days of capture and every six months thereafter. 66 The United States conceded that the process afforded to Bagram detainees to challenge their status was less rigorous than the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) that the Bouemediene Court had found inadequate. 67 Some of the most glaring deficiencies included: no legal representation for detainees (or even access to a "personal representative" as the CSRTs permitted); no opportunity for detainees to testify in person or to rebut evidence against them; and no supervisory or appellate body empowered to review UECRB status determinations. 68 Thus, Judge Bates concluded that the "adequacy of process" factor weighed heavily in favor of petitioners-even more heavily than in Boumediene. 69 The site of apprehension factor weighed against petitioners' entitlement to the writ because petitioners were captured outside the United States. 70 Guantanamo were rendered there from third countries, this was not the case at Bagram. Located in an active theater of war, Bagram mostly comprised detainees captured in Afghanistan, many of whom were Afghan citizens. 71 However, the petitioners in this case were third-country nationals who alleged that they had been rendered to Bagram from other, non-battlefield locations. Judge Bates noted that the site of apprehension was therefore more important in this case than in Boumediene. 72 Nonetheless, he concluded that petitioners could not be materially distinguished from their Boumediene counterparts, as they were all captured outside the United States. 73 The site of detention and practical obstacles factors required the most explanation. Both pertained to the nature of Bagram Air Base and the American presence there. The site of detention analysis turned on the "objective degree of control" that the United States exerted over Bagram and the duration of its presence there. 74 Specifically, the district court had to determine whether Bagram was more akin to Guantanamo Bay or Landsberg Prison-the site of detention at issue in the post-World War II case Johnson v. Eisentrager. 75 In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court declined to extend the writ to 21 German nationals imprisoned at an Allied facility in Germany, after a Military Commission in China convicted them. 76 The Government consistently argued that Bagram was analogous to Landsberg, which was jointly controlled by Allied forces and had only existed for five years when the Court decided Eisentrager. 77 By contrast, it pointed out that the United States had an exclusive lease over Guantanamo Bay for more than 100 years. 78 In comparison, as of 2009, the United States had occupied Bagram for less than a decade and the Government maintained that it had no long-term interest in maintaining the base. 79 Judge Bates agreed with the Government on the question of duration. However, he found the "objective degree of control" over Bagram was closer to Guantanamo. 80 This was based on subtle, but important, differences in the legal agreements governing Landsberg and Bagram. At Landsberg, the four Allied representatives (the United States, UK, France, and Soviet Union) had joint con-trol over the facility, and any action required unanimous consent. 81 The lease governing Bagram, however, gave the United States exclusive control over the premises. 82 This exclusive control extended to the Bagram Theater Internment Facility where petitioners were held. 83 Thus, the United States, not its allies, detained individuals at Bagram and did not require the approval or consent of any other country in its decision making with respect to detainees.
The final factor for Judge Bates to consider was "practical obstacles inherent in resolving . . . [petitioners'] entitlement to the writ." 84 Boumediene specifically contemplated that this factor would weigh more strongly in the Government's favor if detainees were housed within an active theater of war. 85 However, as Judge Bates observed, the petitioners in Eisentrager received a "rigorous adversarial process to test the legality of their detention" in China following the Japanese surrender in 1945. 86 If this was possible in the aftermath of World War II, it "strains credulity" to believe that a similar process would not be possible in a secure American military base. 87 The Government raised two further "practical" concerns: (1) that gathering evidence and providing access to counsel would prove difficult in a war zone; and (2) that extending the writ to petitioners would cause friction with the Afghan government. 88 On the first point, Judge Bates conceded that Eisentrager had been concerned about the practical difficulties of producing petitioners in the United States for habeas corpus proceedings. 89 However, he stated that technological advances such as "real-time video-conferencing" would obviate the need to physically produce petitioners in an American courtroom. 90 On the second point, Judge Bates simply pointed out that al Maqaleh, al Najar and al Bakri are not citizens of Afghanistan, meaning that no Afghan court had jurisdiction to hear their cases and that they would not be transferred to Afghan custody. 92 Thus, it was unlikely that habeas proceedings for these detainees would create tension with Afghan authorities. 93 Judge Bates ended his discussion of this factor with an important observation: "The only reason these petitioners are in an active theater of war is because respondents brought them there." 94 This echoes the concern voiced earlier in the opinion regarding the Executive's ability to manipulate or evade writ jurisdiction "merely by deciding who will be held where." 95 On balance, Judge Bates found that when the Boumediene factors were applied to Al Maqaleh, they weighed in petitioners' favor. 96 Finding no adequate legislative substitute for habeas corpus, the court held MCA section 7(a), the habeas-stripping provision, unconstitutional and denied the Government's motion to dismiss with respect to these three petitioners. 97 
Al Maqaleh II
The United States appealed the judgment in Al Maqaleh I to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. A panel comprised of then-Chief Judge Sentelle, Judge Tatel, and Judge Edwards heard arguments in January 2010 and issued its decision in May (Al Maqaleh II). The judgment reviewed the relevant precedents on the extraterritorial application of the writ, 98 highlighting Boumediene's rejection of formalism or any bright-line test in favor of an approach based on "objective factors and practical concerns." 99 The court noted, however, that there must be a limiting principle to prevent the writ from extending to any United States military facility in the world. As Judge Sentelle put it, "the petitioners seem to be arguing that the fact of United The Court then turned to the Boumediene factors. On the first factor-the citizenship, status, and the adequacy of the process used to determine that status-the court found in favor of petitioners. Judge Sentelle, echoing the district court, noted that as enemy aliens, petitioners were no differently situated from Guantanamo detainees in terms of citizenship and status. 101 The court also found that the Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board (UECRB) process provided less rights protection than the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) at Guantanamo. 102 Thus, the first factor weighed in favor of petitioners' entitlement to the writ.
On the second factor, the D.C. Circuit departed from the district court's analysis. Judge Sentelle's opinion for the court found that both the site of apprehension and site of detention weighed "heavily in favor of the United States." 103 He stated that all three petitioners were apprehended outside American territory, placing them in a similar position to the petitioners in Boumediene. 104 But, in his view, the site of detention at Bagram differed markedly from Guantanamo Bay. For Judge Sentelle, the fact that the leasehold on Bagram was not "permanent" in the way the United States had exclusive control over Guantanamo for over 100 years, coupled with the lack of hostility from the "host country" (Afghanistan), defeated any claim of American de facto sovereignty over Bagram. 105 His opinion therefore concluded that Bagram was more analogous to Landsberg Prison-the site of detention in Eisentrager. 106 The third factor-practical obstacles-tipped the D.C. Circuit's analysis "overwhelmingly in favor" of the Government. 107 Relying heavily on Eisentrager, Judge Sentelle stressed that Bagram was located in an active theater of war, where judicial review would "hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy." 108 Indeed, the ongoing hostilities close to Bagram heightened these concerns. Eisentrager was decided in 1950, five years after World War II, when threats were limited to "the possibility of unrest and guerilla warfare." 109 An additional practical obstacle was created by "the fact that the detention is within the sovereign territory of another nation." 110 According to Judge Sentelle, petitioners' exercise of habeas jurisdic-tion might disrupt the United States-Afghanistan relationship, which further supported the Government's position. 111 The final part of Judge Sentelle's analysis addressed petitioners' claim that the Executive sought to evade judicial review by detaining them in an active theater of war. He dismissed this argument as "speculation" that required no determination from the court. 112 Recall that petitioners had been detained in Bagram since 2002 or 2003, while Boumediene, which extended the writ to Guantanamo, was decided in 2008. Thus, Judge Sentelle pointed out that if military commanders or other officials chose to "turn off the Constitution" with respect to petitioners, they would have had to predict the outcome in Boumediene long before it was decided. 113 For these reasons, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and dismissed all three petitions for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners requested a rehearing en banc, citing new evidence that undermined the Al Maqaleh II judgment. 114 The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for rehearing, but clarified that this denial was "without prejudice to [petitioners'] ability to present this evidence to the district court in the first instance." 115
Al Maqaleh III
Petitioners responded to this order by submitting amended habeas corpus petitions in the district court that included newly discovered evidence. The case once again came before Judge Bates, who issued a short opinion in October 2012 ("Al Maqaleh III"). The D.C. Circuit's judgment limited the scope of the inquiry-the question presented to the District Court was "whether petitioners' new evidence undermines the rationale of the court of appeals' decision." 116 Petitioners presented new evidence in three areas to shift the D.C. Circuit's Boumediene factor analysis in their favor. First, they submitted documents to show that the U.S. Government intended to maintain a long-term presence at Bagram. 117 This pertained to the second Boumediene factor-the site of detention. Al Maqaleh II had concluded that the American presence in Bagram was more akin to Landsberg than Guantanamo-temporary and likely to end shortly after hostilities ceased. 118 Petitioners argued that even though the U.S. Government had started to transfer Afghan detainees to Afghan custody, it had no specific plans to transfer non-Afghan detainees. 119 Petitioners contended this was evidence of American intent to detain them indefinitely. Judge Bates dismissed this argument as "mak[ing] little sense." 120 In his view, this evidence could be read to imply the opposite-that by transferring some detainees, the U.S. Government was demonstrating a good faith effort to eventually transfer (or release) all remaining detainees. 121 Second, petitioners sought to demonstrate that the practical obstacles involved in extending the writ to them were not as formidable as the D.C. Circuit had concluded. Shortly after Al Maqaleh II, the Afghan government began conducting trials for Afghan detainees. 122 While the U.S. Government argued that Afghan authorities solely conducted these trials, Judge Bates found that the U.S. Government facilitated the process by permitting detainees in American custody to stand trial and by "mentoring the Afghan participants." 123 However, he also found that such trials had no bearing on whether the U.S. Government could conduct habeas proceedings. For one thing, full-blown trials conducted-not merely mentored-by the U.S. government would divert more resources from the battlefield, 124 presenting another "practical obstacle" to habeas proceedings. Further, Americanled trials might carry greater security risks and, if conflicts emerged between the judiciary and military, it would be "highly comforting to enemies of the United States." 125 Third, petitioners presented new evidence of executive manipulation or evasion of habeas jurisdiction. Citing declarations from former U.S. officials, government documents, and newspaper articles, petitioners argued that detainee transfers from Bagram to Guantanamo decreased sharply following Rasul v. Bush, decided in 2004. 126 Moreover, a "reverse flow" of detainees-from Guantanamo to Bagram-was initiated after Rasul for the purpose of evading writ jurisdiction. 127 Judge Bates dismissed these allegations of executive manipulation. He pointed out, among other things, that Rasul was not a bright-line and that detainees were transferred from Bagram to Guantanamo af- ter the decision was issued. 128 As for the fact that detainee numbers had increased at Bagram, Judge Bates noted the proximity of Bagram to conflict zones as well as the "international publicity and criticism surrounding Guantanamo" that would make Bagram a more logical detention site. 129 Judge Bates also reiterated the D.C. Circuit's concern that petitioners' argument had no limiting principle. 130 If the writ were extended to Bagram, it would potentially create "universal habeas jurisdiction, a result far beyond what Boumediene contemplated." 131 Since this new evidence did not tip the Boumediene factor analysis in petitioners' favor, Judge Bates dismissed their habeas petitions for lack of jurisdiction.
Al Maqaleh IV
Petitioners appealed this ruling to the D.C. Circuit. A three-judge panel-this time comprised of Judges Henderson, Griffith and Williams-heard arguments in September 2013 and issued a judgment in December ("Al Maqaleh IV"). 132 Judge Henderson's majority opinion hews closely to Al Maqaleh II and III. She framed the question before the court in very narrow terms: "to determine whether the circumstances underlying Al Maqaleh II have changed so drastically that we must revisit it." 133 The ensuing Boumediene factor analysis covered much of the same ground as past opinions, with a few notable exceptions.
The court's analysis of the first factor-citizenship, status and the adequacy of process-reiterated much of what Judge Sentelle found in Al Maqaleh II. 134 The fact that petitioners were aliens and detained pursuant to "enemy combatant" status left them similarly situated to petitioners in Boumediene. 135 However, Judge Henderson noted that the "adequacy of process" prong did not weigh as strongly in petitioners' favor as it had in Al Maqaleh II because of procedural improvements at Bagram. 136 had been replaced with Detainee Review Boards (DRBs), 137 a process that permitted detainees to consult with a "personal representative" (who did not necessarily have legal training), call witnesses, submit evidence, and examine exculpatory evidence. 138 Since these minimal protections did not exist within the UECRB process, the court held that this factor weighed less in petitioners' favor than it did in Al Maqaleh II. 139 On the second factor-the site of apprehension and detention-the court's analysis centered on the nature and potential duration of American control over Bagram. The court relied on two documents to conclude that the United States had no intention to maintain a longterm presence at Bagram. First, it cited the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Afghan governments, which provided for the transfer of all Afghan detainees to Afghan custody. 140 According to the U.S. Government, this transfer was completed in mid-2013. 141 Second, the court relied on the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (ESPA) between the two governments, which would permit U.S. forces to use Afghan military facilities until 2014. 142 Petitioners argued that even if Afghan detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, the U.S. Government intended to detain non-Afghan detainees beyond 2014. 143 The court dismissed this argument as inapposite. As Judge Henderson put it, "[t]he indefiniteness of the United States's control over the place of detention, not over the prisoners, is the relevant issue." 144 Judge Henderson's analysis placed the most emphasis on the practical obstacles factor. She reiterated many of the concerns that animated the Al Maqaleh II judgment, 145 including the fact that Bagram is located in an active theater of war and the prospect of habeas corpus trials undermining the prestige and authority of military commanders. 146 Maqaleh II to discuss separation of powers concerns. Stressing that the "President alone conducts the nation's foreign policy" and that the conduct of foreign relations is "largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference," Judge Henderson effectively ruled that the court lacked the constitutional authority and institutional wherewithal to question the political branches with respect to detention policy. 147 In this vein, she dismissed petitioners' claims of executive manipulation of writ jurisdiction, finding it "utterly incredible" that the President could have predicted Boumediene in advance and chosen to detain individuals at Bagram, rather than at Guantanamo, as a result. 148 Al Maqaleh IV therefore dismissed the amended petitions for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2014. However, none of the petitioners was in U.S. custody when the justices reached the case in March 2015. More specifically, al Maqaleh and al Bakri had been transferred to Yemeni authorities, while al Najar was in Afghan custody. 149 For that reason, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot and vacated the judgment of the D.C. Circuit. 150 The Supreme Court's dismissal of this case leaves Al Maqaleh IV as the final word on the extraterritorial reach of the writ. As I argue in the following sections, this is a troubling development, for it curtails detainee access to U.S. courts to an extent far greater than Boumediene anticipated.
III. REVISITING THE SITE OF APPREHENSION AND SITE OF DETENTION FACTORS
The D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh misconstrues the second Boumediene factor: "the nature of the sites of where apprehension and then detention took place." 151 By misreading Boumediene and Eisentrager and not accounting for subtle factual peculiarities of Bagram, both D.C. Circuit opinions, Al Maqaleh II and Al Maqaleh IV, make the site of apprehension practically irrelevant, while construing the site of detention too formalistically.
A. Site of Apprehension
On the site of apprehension, neither Judge Sentelle nor Judge Henderson grapples with petitioners' claim that they were apprehended outside Afghanistan and extraordinarily rendered to Bagram. Judge Henderson's opinion in Al Maqaleh IV does not even mention the site of apprehension in its analysis. 152 In Al Maqaleh II, Judge Sentelle's opinion for the court simply stated that petitioners were apprehended outside the United States, which placed them in the same position as detainees at Guantanamo. 153 This finding elides an important distinction between the two facilities. Whereas detainees at Guantanamo were all captured outside Cuba, Bagram was located in an active theater of war and therefore mostly housed individuals captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan. 154 Petitioners were therefore exceptional at Bagram in a sense that they would not be at Guantanamo-they were captured outside Afghan territory and away from hostilities. This is significant for two reasons.
First, it raises further doubts about petitioners' status. As Judge Bates noted in Al Maqaleh I, the Supreme Court did not provide much guidance on the "status" prong of the first Boumediene factor. 155 As in Boumediene, the Al Maqaleh petitioners were designated "enemy combatants"-a broad designation referring to individuals who were "part of, or supporting, forces, engaged in hostilities" against the United States or its allies. 156 The breadth of this definition, coupled with the fact that petitioners challenged their status, led Judge Bates to stress the need for "meaningful process" to guard against wrongful classification. 157 He then concluded that the existing UECRB review process was inadequate, as it provided even fewer protections than the flawed CSRT procedures at issue in Boumediene. 158 The D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh II did not analyze the status factor in any depth, but likewise concluded that the UECRB process did not pass constitutional muster. 159 However, neither court examined the effect of the site of apprehension on the status of these detainees. Recall that petitioners al Najar and al Bakri claimed to have been abducted from Pakistan and Thailand, respectively. 160 The Government did not dispute these allegations. 161 164 When petitioners asserted this fact in later briefs, the Government did not contest it. 165 Thus, the "enemy combatant" status for all three petitioners is less credible than it would be for those captured in Afghanistan during hostilities. Two petitioners, al Najar and al Bakri, were taken unarmed and far away from hostilities; al Maqaleh's site of apprehension remains unclear, but the fact that he was initially detained at Abu Ghraib strongly suggests that he was captured outside Afghanistan. Thus, the likelihood that these petitioners were wrongfully captured and detained is higher than it would be for most detainees at Bagram.
Beyond raising doubts about the petitioners' status, the apprehension of the petitioners outside Afghanistan-in connection with their subsequent transfer to Bagram-is also significant because this transfer is probative of U.S. Government intent to evade habeas corpus jurisdiction. If petitioners were captured outside Afghanistan and were not Afghan citizens, why were they subsequently transferred to Bagram? One possibility is that by detaining these individuals in an active theater of war, the Government could hold them indefinitely beyond the reach of federal courts. Judge Bates raised this concern in Al Maqaleh I, noting that such rendition "resurrects the same specter of limitless Executive power the Supreme Court sought to guard against in Boumediene." 166 Boumediene stated that it would be a "striking anomaly" to allow the political branches to "switch the Constitution on or off at will" and that the power to determine "what the law is" remains with the judiciary. 167 Here, the U.S. Government could have chosen to detain petitioners at Guantanamo, but chose instead to house them at Bagram. This decision was likely influenced by a calculation that the writ would not extend to Bagram because, among other things, the practical obstacles hindering habeas proceedings in a war zone are far greater. 168 that Boumediene sought to avoid-one in which political actors manipulate the site of detention to evade constitutional protections. 169 The following sections will address practical obstacles and executive manipulation in greater detail, but it is worth noting here the importance of the site of apprehension in this analysis. If petitioners were captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, their detention at Bagram would raise few, if any, concerns of unchecked executive authority to "decide when and where [the Constitution's] terms apply." 170
B. Site of Detention
While the D.C. Circuit mostly neglected the site of apprehension, both Judge Sentelle and Judge Henderson's opinions for the court in Al Maqaleh II and Al Maqaleh IV discussed the site of detention at length. 171 They found that the United States did not exercise sufficient control over Bagram Air Base to justify extending the writ to detainees there. 172 This conclusion rests on three faulty premises: (1) that Eisentrager makes de facto sovereignty an essential factor in the Boumediene analysis; (2) that the short duration of the U.S. lease over Bagram determines the degree of American control over the base; and (3) that the lack of U.S. intent to maintain a "permanent" presence at Bagram militates against petitioners.
Is Sovereignty a Necessary Condition for Writ Jurisdiction? a. De Facto Sovereignty
In Al Maqaleh II, Judge Sentelle analyzed Eisentrager in great detail to determine whether the writ extends to detainees outside the sovereign territory of the United States. In fact, Eisentrager arguably overshadows Boumediene in his opinion. Section II ("the Analysis") of the opinion begins with an overview of Eisentrager and then traces its development as the "governing precedent" on the extraterritorial reach of the writ. 173 Judge Sentelle repeatedly stressed that the Supreme Court has not overruled Eisentrager, as Rasul and Boumediene explicitly denied doing so. 174 Significantly, in both cases, the D.C.
ter of war because the United States chose to send them there."); see also infra Part V (discussing "executive manipulation of writ jurisdiction" Circuit had relied on Eisentrager to deny habeas corpus jurisdiction to detainees at Guantanamo, only to be reversed by the Supreme Court. 175 Boumediene rejected the D.C. Circuit's contention that de jure sovereignty over the detention facility was necessary for entitlement to the writ; 176 Justice Kennedy found instead that a "common thread" uniting the precedents in this area is that "practical concerns, not formalism" must guide the analysis. 177 Judge Sentelle initially stated in Al Maqaleh II that the D.C. Circuit "rejects the proposition" that Boumediene would adopt a "brightline test." 178 However, when the court analyzed the site-of-detention factor, it effectively imposed a bright-line rule. In his opinion, Judge Sentelle said that while de facto sovereignty is "not determinative . . . the very fact that it was the subject of much discussion in Boumediene makes it obvious that it is not without relevance." 179 He went on to find that "the notion that de facto sovereignty extends to Bagram is no more real" than it would be for Landsberg Prison in Eisentrager. 180 This move to confer primacy on de facto sovereignty was foreshadowed at oral argument. The U.S. Government had essentially argued that Boumediene requires de facto (if not de jure) sovereignty as a precondition for habeas corpus. Judge Tatel, during oral argument for Al Maqaleh II, questioned Government counsel vigorously on this point, noting that, in his view, Boumediene required balancing of several factors, with no individual factor "being dispositive, one way or the other." 181 At oral argument, Judge Sentelle then framed a question to counsel that revealed his position quite clearly:
Judge Sentelle: If the Guantanamo de facto sovereignty factor is sine qua non, the other factors are added there too, but is it the government's position that that is a necessary factor for a habeas [sic] 185 For instance, the nature of the lease and the objective degree of the United States' control over Bagram-which the district court discussed at length in the Al Maqaleh I opinion-are not mentioned at all in Judge Sentelle's site of detention analysis. 186 I will return to these fact-based determinations shortly, but it is important to first examine whether Eisentrager, which plays such an important role in Al Maqaleh II, actually held that the writ cannot be extended to aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United States.
b. Eisentrager's Holding
Eisentrager is factually analogous to Al Maqaleh in some respects. The German petitioners in that case, too, were aliens detained outside the de jure territory of the United States. 187 However, unlike the Al Maqaleh petitioners, the Eisentrager petitioners had been tried by a U.S. Military Commission. 188 They were convicted for violating the laws of war by continuing to engage in hostilities against the United States after Germany's surrender. 189 The question for the Supreme Court was whether petitioners should be permitted to challenge the legality of their "trial, conviction and imprisonment" in federal court. 190 From Judge Sentelle's analysis in Al Maqaleh II, it appears that Eisentrager was (1) primarily concerned with extraterritorial jurisdiction and (2) ultimately arrived at the broad conclusion that enemy aliens detained abroad were categorically denied the writ. 191 On closer inspection, however, neither of these characterizations is accurate. First, it is not clear that Eisentrager was a jurisdictional holding per se. Justice Jackson's majority opinion in Eisentrager purports to focus on jurisdiction, but delves into the merits of the German petitioners' claims as well. Indeed, while Parts I and II of the opinion set forth the relevant jurisdictional precedents and the difficulties of extending the writ to Landsberg prison, respectively, 192 Parts III and IV change course. Part III addresses-and rejects-petitioners' claim that they should be immune from military jurisdiction; 193 Part IV responds to specific objections to the jurisdiction of the Military Commission in China that tried and convicted petitioners. 194 If Eisentrager simply held that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear petitioners' claims, how can we make sense of Parts III and IV of Justice Jackson's majority opinion? One answer is that Eisentrager is really a merits decision that has been misinterpreted as a
jurisdictional one. This is what Stephen Vladeck argues in Eisentrager's (Forgotten) Merits: Military Jurisdiction and Collateral
Habeas. 195 Relying on the case's "hidden history," Vladeck shows that petitioners' main claim before the Military Commission was that it lacked jurisdiction to try them. 196 According to Vladeck, this remained petitioners' principal claim throughout the litigation in U.S. courts, but it was obfuscated by lower court decisions. 197 The district court dismissed the case, holding that Ahrens v. Clark prevented federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over extraterritorial habeas petitions on statutory grounds. 198 This was a misreading of Ahrens, which explicitly avoided ruling on the extraterritorial application of habeas corpus. 199 Ahrens held that federal law only granted habeas jurisdiction to courts within a detainee's "district of confinement." 200 As Vladeck puts it, this is a "choice-of-venue provision for individuals detained within the United States." 201 Instead of simply reversing the district court on Ahrens, the D.C. Circuit in Eisentrager relied on the Suspension Clause to hold that habeas corpus extended to any prisoner in U.S. custody-even those held outside American territory. 202 Thus, the Supreme Court had to focus its attention on this overbroad D.C. Circuit ruling, which required in-depth discussion of the jurisdictional limits of the Suspension Clause. 203 The Court rejected the D.C. Circuit's approach, which is why Justice Jackson's opinion in Eisentrager is generally cited for the proposition that federal courts lack jurisdiction over aliens detained abroad. 204 In Vladeck's view, a better explanation of Eisentrager-one that makes sense of Parts III and IV-arises from what was "black-letter law" in 1950: that collateral attacks of military commission rulings were limited to "whether the military had properly exercised jurisdiction." 205 In this vein, Justice Jackson in Eisentrager analyzed the lawfulness of the Military Commission's jurisdiction in Part IV of his analysis, drawing from Ex Parte Quirin and In Re Yamashita. 206 More specifically, he cited Yamashita for the proposition that "correction [of military commission] errors . . . is not for the courts but for military authorities . . . we consider here only the lawful power of the commission to try the petitioner for the offense charged." 207 Part IV concluded with this statement: "We are unable to find that the petition alleges any fact showing lack of jurisdiction in the military authorities to accuse, try and condemn these prisoners or that they acted in excess of their lawful powers." 208 Thus, it appears Justice Jackson in Eisentrager reached, and rejected on the merits, the petitioners' claim that the Military Commission lacked jurisdiction over them. This has important implications for how courts should read Eisentrager. As Vladeck puts it, "Clearly, Eisentrager did not mean to foreclose access to habeas corpus for all non-citizens detained outside the territorial United States." 209 Rather, it appears to simply stand for the proposition that aliens have no recourse in federal court after conviction by a military commission that properly exercised jurisdiction abroad. 210 Vladeck's analysis shows quite convincingly that Eisentrager has been misread in subsequent cases as a jurisdictional, as opposed to a merits, judgment. 211 Justice Jackson's opinion in Eisentrager, however, repeatedly ties the petitioners' status to the fact that they were detained abroad. In Part I of Eisentrager, following an exhaustive survey of wartime precedents, Justice Jackson concluded, "[T]he nonresident enemy alien, especially one who has remained in the service of the enemy, does not have . . . qualified access to our courts." 213 In Part II of Eisentrager, when applying the law to petitioners, Justice Jackson listed six factors that obstructed their access to the writ. As he put it:
We must hold that a prisoner of our military authorities is constitutionally entitled to the writ, even though he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the Unites States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States. 214 At first glance, this list of factors seems almost exclusively concerned with the extraterritorial aspects of the Eisentrager petitioners' case. Five out of the six factors-factor (a) is the exception-concern the foreign sites of apprehension, detention, laws of war violations, and the military commission. However, factors (c), (d), and (e) also pertain to the petitioners' status. That they were held as prisoners of war and were tried and convicted for laws of war violations by a military commission are central to Justice Jackson's analysis. 215 In addition, factor (a), that petitioners are enemy aliens, presumes that their "enemy" status has been determined through an adequate legal process. As Justice Jackson later noted, while courts are open, in limited instances, to resident aliens "of friendly personal disposition," this accommodation is not made for enemy aliens. 216 an enemy power. There is no fiction about their enmity." 217 In other words, the Military Commission had clearly determined that petitioners were enemy aliens. Petitioners in Al Maqaleh contested their status as "enemy combatants" and were never given the opportunity to meaningfully challenge that status.
In contrast, Parts III and IV of the Eisentrager judgment proceed to show that the Military Commission had the authority to make this determination, 218 lest there was any doubt about the legality of its exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, even if we were to interpret Eisentrager as primarily a jurisdictional ruling, it does not condition jurisdiction solely on the site of detention, while relegating other factors, like the petitioner's status and the adequacy of process, to the "background." 219 Rather, these factors are intertwined in Justice Jackson's Eisentrager analysis, and together compelled that writ jurisdiction could not be extended to the German detainees at Landsberg.
Conflating Degree and Duration of Control
The "touchstone" of the site of detention analysis is the "objective degree of control" exercised by the United States over the detention facility. 220 Boumediene's functional approach requires a careful examination of the facts surrounding U.S. control over specific military bases. 221 In Al Maqaleh, both the district court in Al Maqaleh I and court of appeals in Al Maqaleh II framed the issue in relative terms, seeking to determine if Bagram was more akin to Landsberg Prison or to Guantanamo Bay. 222 In Al Maqaleh I, the district court undertook this analysis in detail, noting important differences between the lease agreements that governed Landsberg and Bagram. 223 In particular, Judge Bates stressed that while the Allies jointly controlled operations at Landsberg, the United States exercised sole authority over the prison facility at Bagram, including over determinations on whether to detain particular individuals. 224 Judge Bates later noted that the duration of control was also relevant in Boumediene, as in that case, the United States had exclusive control over Guantanamo Bay for more than 100 years. 225 Court must consider future intentions of the United States at Bagram as well." 226 This is an important aspect of the analysis, especially in the present-day global war against terrorism, where hostilities might continue indefinitely. 227 The D.C. Circuit, however, rejected this sort of contextual analysis in Al Maqaleh II. At oral argument, Judge Sentelle refused to acknowledge that the Eisentrager petitioners were under the joint authority of the Allies and therefore not subject to plenary U.S. control. In comparision, the Al Maqaleh petitioners were subjected to plenary U.S. control. 228 More importantly, Judge Sentelle's Al Maqaleh II opinion fails to reference the two lease agreements, much less compare the degree of U.S. control over Landsberg and Bagram. 229 Rather, Judge Sentelle simply relied on the fact that the United States had maintained "total control" over Guantanamo Bay for more than 100 years in the face of a "hostile" Cuban government. 230 He contrasted this to the short duration of U.S. control over Bagram (approximately eight years at the time) exercised with the consent of Afghan authorities. 231 This approach conflates the duration of control with the much more significant "objective degree of control." 232 It also fails to account for the potential duration of hostilities going forward. Because of the diffuse and asymmetric threat posed by terrorism, U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan had no clear end date. 233 Unsurprisingly, U.S. Government briefs before the D.C. Circuit in 2010 do not mention a date-even a tentative one-by which hostilities might have ended. 234 The D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh II therefore erred in treating the short duration of the U.S. presence at Bagram as essentially dispositive. Both the objective degree of control and the potential for a long- nize that the national security underpinnings of the war on terror, although crucially important, are broad and malleable. As the Government concedes, given its unconventional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal cease-fire agreement." (internal citations omitted)). 234. See Brief for Respondents-Appellants, supra note 77.
term U.S. presence at Bagram should have been given substantial weight in this analysis.
A "Permanent" U.S. Presence at Bagram
In its Al Maqaleh briefs, the U.S. Government disavowed any intention to remain at Bagram permanently. 235 Judge Sentelle took this assertion at face value, noting in Al Maqaleh II, "there is no indication of any intent to occupy [Bagram Air Base] with permanence." 236 Regardless of the veracity of this claim, it fundamentally misconstrues the relevant language in Boumediene on this issue. The majority opinion in Boumediene never used the term "permanent" or any of its predicates. 237 Rather, on four occasions, the judgment refers to the "indefinite" nature of detention. 238 For our purposes, the most relevant uses of the term relate to Eisentrager and the indefiniteness of U.S. control over Landsberg. As Justice Kennedy stated in Boumediene when comparing the United States' control over Landsberg, Germany to Guantanamo, "The United States' control over the prison in Germany was neither absolute nor indefinite." He later noted the United States did not intend to "govern [Landsberg] indefinitely." 239 The difference between "permanent" and "indefinite" is substantial. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary defines permanent as "lasting or continuing for a very long time or forever: not temporary or changing." 240 In comparison, it defines indefinite as "not certain in amount or length" or "not clear or certain in meaning or details." 241 In Al Maqaleh, it is likely true that the United States had no intention to remain at Bagram permanently. There would surely be no need to maintain a presence in Afghanistan if hostilities ended. However, this does not directly bear on the question of whether the U.S. presence at Bagram-and its detention of petitioners-was indefinite. The fact that petitioners were held for several years, with no potential date of release or end of hostilities, strongly suggests that their detention was indefinite-both in terms of length and the terms under which they might be released. With respect to the indefinite length of detention, the Supreme Court warned in Hamdi that the unconventional, fluid nature of the "war on terror" could result in detention without end. 243 When Al Maqaleh I was released, the petitioners had been detained for at least six years. 244 It is striking that, more than one year later, the D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh II did not mention the length (or indefiniteness) of petitioners' detention, nor the duration of the U.S. presence at Bagram. 245 Instead, Al Maqaleh II misconstrued the underlying language in Boumediene to require U.S. Government intent to occupy Bagram with "permanence." 246 In Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson similarly misconstrued Boumediene's relevant language. In response to petitioners' claim that they had been detained indefinitely, she wrote, "The Appellants misapprehend the import of the [site of detention] factor . . . the indefiniteness of the United States' control over the place of detention, not over prisoners, is the relevant issue." 247 As in Al Maqaleh II, this formalistic reading of one of Boumediene belies the interconnectedness of various aspects of the analysis. While it is true that the site of detention analysis is concerned with U.S. control over Bagram, the fact that petitioners were held indefinitely for a decade at this point was relevant to the adequacy-of-process prong of the first Boumediene factor. 248 In addition, Judge Henderson appears to use "indefinite" and "permanent" interchangeably in her Al Maqaleh IV opinion. For example, in the next paragraph of her opinion, she reiterated Judge Sentelle's finding in Al Maqualeh II that the United States "had no intention of remaining in Afghanistan permanently . . . . We took the Government at its word." 249 Factual 248. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797 ("Some of these petitioners have been in custody for six years with no definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention. Their access to the writ is a necessity to determine the lawfulness of their status, even if, in the end, they do not obtain the relief they seek."). 249. Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 328 (emphasis added).
authorities. 250 Moreover, the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (ESPA) between the two states gave "U.S. forces continued access to and use of Afghan facilities through 2014." 251 While Judge Henderson's Al Maqaleh IV opinion conceded that 2014 was not a "sell by" date, she found that it supported the conclusion reached in Al Maqaleh II-that there was no indication of U.S. intent to remain at Bagram "with permanence." 252 As it turned out, the United States ended formal combat operations in December 2014 and transferred petitioners out of its custody at approximately the same time. 253 Thus, in hindsight, Judge Henderson's conclusion in Al Maqaleh IV-that the site of detention weighed in favor of the Governmentseems more defensible than it was in Al Maqaleh II, which was decided three years earlier. However, as the final word on the site of detention analysis, Al Maqaleh IV leaves much to be desired. It not only repeats and reinforces the error in Al Maqaleh II of confusing "indefiniteness" with "permanence," but Judge Henderson's Al Maqaleh IV opinion also refused to probe into the U.S. Government's assertions that it did not intend to remain in Afghanistan in the long term. 254 Despite the Government's best intentions, unforeseen circumstances, such as an enemy surge or withdrawal of allied forces, might have required combat operations to continue long after 2014. 255 Additionally, while the U.S. Government had transferred the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), its main detention facility, and Afghan detainees to Afghanistan in 2013, it had not showed any desire to transfer or release third-country nationals like the Al Maqaleh petitioners. In fact, news reports in this period suggested that such detainees would be held separately in U.S. custody for an unspecified period. 256 These reports, coupled with the fact that petitioners had been detained for ten or eleven years, should have given the court in Al Maqaleh IV pause that the government's intentions might not have been as transparent as they claimed. More fundamentally, the judicial role in habeas corpus proceedings is to provide a meaningful check on potential executive abuses of power, not to "[take] the Government at its word." 257 
IV. WHEN PRACTICAL OBSTABLES BECOME PRACTICALLY INSURMOUNTABLE
The third Boumediene factor used to determine the bounds of habeas jurisdiction is "practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ." 258 In his discussion of this factor in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy noted that "[h]abeas corpus proceedings may require expenditure of funds by the government and may divert the attention of military personnel," but he made clear that such concerns are not dispositive. 259 He distinguished Eisentrager on the grounds that American forces in post-war Germany were responsible for an enormous rebuilding effort and faced security threats from guerilla and residual enemy forces. 260 These concerns were not present at Guantanamo. 261 Then, as dicta, Justice Kennedy stated, "[I]f the detention facility were located in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ would be 'impracticable or anomalous' would have more weight." 262 In Al Maqaleh II, the D.C. Circuit latched onto this dictum to hold that the practical obstacles prong "weighs overwhelmingly" in favor of the United States. 263 It drew support from Eisentrager, which discussed the potential harms of extending habeas jurisdiction to a war zone. These practical obstacles include bringing "aid and comfort to the enemy" and diminishing "the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals." 264 would divert commanders' attention and resources from the battlefield and create a conflict between the judiciary and military that would be "highly comforting to enemies of the United States." 265
A. Overstated Obstacles in Al Maqaleh: A Closer Inspection of the Facts
In Al Maqaleh, it is not clear that substantial resources would have to be diverted from the war effort, nor that the military's prestige would be damaged if habeas jurisdiction were extended to petitioners. Petitioners represented only a tiny fraction of the Bagram detainee population. Their petitions rested heavily on the fact that they were third-country nationals who had been extraordinarily rendered to Afghanistan to face detention. 266 The vast majority of detainees, however, were Afghan nationals captured during hostilities within Afghanistan. 267 Thus, if habeas were only granted to third-country nationals like petitioners, the resources required would be minimal. 268 With respect to the "loss of prestige" concern, it is similarly worth noting that U.S. military forces in Afghanistan did not capture these detainees. 269 Rather, petitioners were all captured outside Afghanistan by unknown agents believed to be working for the United States. 270 Moreover, in Eisentrager, a Military Commission had been convened to try and convict the German petitioners. In that context, habeas proceedings in federal court would more likely damage the military's reputation and create the sort of judiciary-military conflict that could bring "aid and comfort to the enemy." 271 However, since the Al Maqaleh petitioners maintain that irregular forces captured similar passage from Eisentrager and similarly holding that this factor weighed strongly in the Government's favor). them and because a military commission had not convicted them, these concerns are substantially mitigated in their case. 272 This fact-specific analysis is precisely what Judge Bates undertook in Al Maqaleh I. As he elaborated in great detail, Boumediene's functional approach requires that the three-factor test be applied on a detainee-specific basis, not categorically to all Bagram detainees. 273 He also made two additional observations as to why the costs of habeas litigation would not pose serious practical difficulties. First, while Eisentrager was concerned with how to physically produce the petitioners in the United States for trial, these concerns are "significantly mitigated today by technological advances," including video conferencing. 274 Second, gathering evidence, including witness testimony, would not significantly disrupt U.S. operations because these detainees were captured outside Afghanistan. 275 Most of the evidence related to their capture and pre-Bagram activity would therefore be located far away from hostilities. 276 Thus, in Al Maqaleh II, the D.C. Circuit could have ruled narrowly to provide habeas proceedings for only the handful of detainees that fit petitioners' description. Such a ruling would not apply to Afghan detainees or those captured during hostilities. 277 This would not have significantly diverted resources from the battlefield nor seriously affected the military's reputation.
However, Al Maqaleh II rejected this detainee-specific approach for a categorical one. The opinion does not engage with the peculiar circumstances that gave rise to petitioners' claim. 278 to contain enemy elements, guerrilla fighters, and werewolves." 296 The fact that Guantanamo faced no such threats substantially contributed to Justice Kennedy's conclusion in Boumediene that there were "few practical barriers to the running of the writ." 297 Thus, in Al Maqaleh IV, the fact that full-blown criminal trials could take place at Bagram should have been factored into the practical obstacles analysis. In particular, in Al Maqaleh IV, the D.C. Circuit should have taken notice of the security situation at Bagram that permitted such trials to be administered. Even if Justice Center in Parwan trials were part of the military offensive, the fact that they could be conducted largely without incident suggests that habeas proceedings could be conducted with fewer security risks than were present in Eisentrager.
In Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson later ventured beyond this formalistic application of the practical obstacles factor to actually change the underlying legal test. In rejecting the argument that the Justice Center in Parwan trials have some bearing on potential habeas litigation, Judge Henderson paid homage to the separation of powers. She declared, "Whether to devote available military resources to the support of the Afghan criminal justice system or to the pursuit of other objectives is the President's choice to make." 298 This, in itself, is innocuous-it merely restates black-letter law; the President is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and speaks with "one voice" in articulating United States foreign policy. 299 However, Judge Henderson proceeded to convert this institutional prerogative into broad deference towards the President and the political branches on jurisdictional questions. In Al Maqaleh III, petitioners introduced a letter from the chief of staff to the Afghan president addressed to their counsel. 300 It stated that the government of Af-ghanistan had no desire to keep foreign nationals on its soil and supported these detainees receiving trials "by a competent court." 301 This letter challenged the Al Maqaleh II finding that habeas proceedings in "the sovereign territory of another nation" might create "practical difficulties" by disrupting the United States' relationship with Afghanistan. 302 Judge Bates in Al Maqaleh III found that the letter was not dispositive of Afghan government intent because, among other things, it was a private letter that did not purport to represent the official position of the Afghan government. 303 In Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson agreed with this factual conclusion, but then reiterated her separation of powers concerns more strongly. As she put it, "Trying to divine the letter's meaning would carry us beyond the bounds of our authority and into the exclusive province . . . of the Executive." 304 Continuing the analysis in Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson then introduced issues of institutional competence to buttress this separation-of-powers concern. She noted, for instance, that "[f]oreign affairs are complicated and require a political adroitness that courts simply cannot supply." 305 Because of conflicting statements on the Afghan government's position on detainee policy-both from within the government and in the media-Judge Henderson concluded that the D.C. Circuit could not decide what that policy was. 306 The risk of getting it wrong and embarrassing the Executive was too great. 307 In response to petitioners' argument that the Court was abdicating its constitutional duty by failing to inquire into U.S. government policy, Judge Henderson reasserted that foreign relations are "exclusively entrusted" to the political branches and should therefore be "largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." 308 She added, "Judicial inquiry into the President's detention decisions . . . raises grave concerns about encroachment on the President's authority." 309 In effect, Al Maqaleh IV inserted the political question doctrine into the Boumediene factor analysis. 310 strues Boumediene, which rejected separation of powers formalism in the context of habeas jurisdiction. 311 As discussed, the test for jurisdiction emerging from Boumediene is a practical one. 312 The third prong-practical obstacles-is concerned with precisely what it says, practical difficulties in extending the writ of habeas corpus. These include concerns with respect to resource allocation, security, and the military's prestige. 313 Institutional or constitutional concerns, such as the judiciary's competence or its proper role in matters of foreign relations, are not relevant. Al Maqaleh IV also fails to understand the nature of the political question doctrine and justiciability concerns generally. Whether a case presents a "political question" unsuitable for judicial resolution is a determination on the merits. 314 This should not be conflated with the jurisdictional question of whether the writ of habeas corpus can be extended to Bagram. Justiciability issues arise only after jurisdiction has been established. 315 By yielding to the political branches at the jurisdictional stage in Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson essentially gives political leaders a carte blanche. It appears from her analysis that any Executive invocation of practical difficulties or strained relations with another country is beyond the judicial ken and warrants almost complete deference. That such deference extends even to questions of jurisdiction-such as whether the Suspension Clause applies to diction. This concern does not directly arise from the Boumediene factors per se, but from the broader tenor of Justice Kennedy's Boumediene majority opinion. 317 If the Executive deliberately chose Bagram for this purpose, it should tilt the second and third Boumediene factors in petitioners' favor. As discussed, this would most directly impact the site of apprehension and detention factor. 318 Since petitioners were neither Afghan nationals nor captured in Afghanistan, 319 they could have potentially been detained at Guantanamo and would have therefore been entitled to writ protection. The practical obstacles factor, too, would weigh less strongly in favor of the Government if it turned out that petitioners were moved to Bagram specifically to create the sorts of practical difficulties inherent in an active theater of war. 320 In Al Maqaleh II, the D.C. Circuit conceded that executive manipulation of petitioners' detention site to evade jurisdiction would factor into the Boumediene analysis, but declined to find that such evasion occurred in this case. 321 As Judge Sentelle noted, Boumediene's three factors were not exhaustive and therefore executive manipulation "might constitute an additional factor." 322 In Al Maqaleh II, the Court found petitioners' arguments on this point to be "unsupported by the evidence" or "by reason." 323 If the Executive had deliberately chosen to "turn off the Constitution," it would have had to anticipate Boumediene's outcome long before the case was decided in 2008. 324 To be fair, this issue had not been fully briefed in Al Maqaleh II. Petitioners, in their Joint Brief, focused largely on the enumerated Boumediene factors, which Al Maqaleh I had construed in their favor. 325 Executive manipulation was only discussed within these factors, with references to Judge Bates' Al Maqaleh I opinion below. 326 However, once Al Maqaleh II declared that evasion of writ jurisdiction 317. See id. at 765 ("The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply."); id. at 766 (noting that the scope of the Suspension Clause "must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain." due-process rights." 334 Another article reported that four high-value detainees were transferred from Guantanamo to CIA "black sites" in 2003 so that they could be interrogated without access to legal counsel or to the federal courts. 335 Third, petitioners submitted sworn declarations from two former U.S. government officials: Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson and Glenn Carle. 336 Colonel Wilkerson was, inter alia, Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell from 2002-05. 337 Colonel Wilkerson confirmed what the Yoo-Philbin memo suggested-that the "deliberate choice" to detain individuals at Guantanamo and Bagram in the early 2000s was "often motivated in significant part by a desire to place detainees outside the jurisdiction of any legal system." 338 Colonel Wilkerson further attested that while petitioners were likely taken to Bagram initially to collect "actionable intelligence" the subsequent decisions to keep them there "were likely motivated by a desire to evade judicial review of their detention." 339 Glenn Carle's declaration introduced a different perspective: the mistreatment of detainees at Bagram. Carle worked for the CIA for 23 years. 340 From November 2003 until his retirement in March 2007, he served as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats on the National Intelligence Council. 341 Much of his declaration attests to the mistreatment of detainees in U.S. custody and the wrongful detention of many "innocent civilians." 342 He also reaffirmed Colonel Wilkerson's statement that U.S. authorities were likely attempting to evade judicial review when they chose to detain petitioners indefinitely at Bagram. 343 In Al Maqaleh III, Judge Bates examined this evidence carefully before ultimately finding it inconclusive. He pointed out that much of the evidence was not "new." 344 It pertained to executive policy prior to Al Maqaleh II, and the D.C. Circuit had rejected the argument that the Executive deliberately manipulated the site of detention. 345 Moreover, the Government disputed that a "reverse flow" of detainees-from Guantanamo to Bagram-developed following Rasul. 346 Judge Bates noted in Al Maqaleh III that some detainees were transferred from Bagram to Guantanamo in September 2004, three months after Rasul was decided. 347 He also stated that the U.S. Government might have had other motivations to house detainees at Bagram, including proximity to the Middle East and the "international publicity and criticism" surrounding Guantanamo. 348 As for the Colonel Wilkerson and Carle Declarations, Judge Bates found that they were "largely cumulative of evidence previously submitted" and, in any event, did not attest specifically to the policy determinations made with respect to petitioners. In other words, these Declarations were "really just conjecture." 349 Al Maqaleh IV went further. There, Judge Henderson added gloss to Al Maqaleh II, suggesting that the D.C. Circuit in that case found it "utterly incredible" that the Executive could have predicted Boumediene's outcome in advance. 350 Her opinion held that manipulation could not be read into either the second or third enumerated Boumediene factors. 351 Al Maqaleh IV then explicitly rejected petitioners' request to create a new factor to account for executive manipulation. 352 In keeping with the separation of powers theme, Judge Henderson stated that "caution must be our watchword" and that "restraint . . . is appropriate" when choosing to expand Boumediene's reach, particularly when such expansion would take the Court further into the "realm of war and foreign policy." 353 Both Al Maqaleh III and IV hold petitioners to an unreasonably high standard of proof. In Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson dismissed petitioners' arguments as speculative, stressing that no piece of evidence showed "that any official ever considered the reach of the writ in deciding where to detain them." 354 address U.S. Government motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 356 petitioners have the burden of establishing jurisdiction, but their petitions should be construed liberally with "the benefit of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the alleged facts." 357 Cumulatively, with factual inferences drawn in their favor, petitioners' evidence strongly suggests that jurisdictional concerns factored into detention policy. The transformation of Bagram from a temporary collection center to a long-term detention facility corresponded with the Supreme Court's extension of habeas corpus to Guantanamo in Rasul. 358 To illustrate this transformation, in early 2004, Bagram detained fewer than 100 individuals; 359 by 2006, it housed 630 detainees, compared to 275 at Guantanamo. 360 This trend accelerated after Boumediene was decided in 2008. By 2011, the Bagram detainee population had swelled to more than 3,000, 361 while the detainee population at Guantanamo had declined to approximately 170 (from a maximum of around 680). 362 Much of the expansion at Bagram happened during the Obama Administration, as Bagram housed only around 600 detainees when President Obama took office in 2009. 363 This data, combined with the 2001 to 2002 government memoranda and the two sworn declarations, is probative of executive intent to replace Guantanamo with Bagram as the principal detention facility, at least in part to evade habeas jurisdiction. Even if there was no "smoking gun" to affirmatively establish a policy of manipulation that specifically targeted petitioners, this evidence should have sufficed at the motion to dismiss stage. As it turned out, the evidence was deemed insufficient. ment of Justice, the Solicitor General, and the White House Counsel were complicit in, or at least aware of, detainee transfers out of Guantanamo to avoid habeas jurisdiction. 371 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE DIMINISHING REACH OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
When it was decided in 2008, Boumediene appeared to be a landmark judgment. The U.S. Government would no longer be able to detain individuals without some basic process and the courts would play a larger role in ensuring that detainee rights were protected. 372 However, the legacy of Boumediene has turned out quite differently. The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to a single detentionrelated case since that decision. 373 In effect, this has ceded exclusive authority to the D.C. Circuit to oversee U.S. detention policy. 374 Since 2008, the D.C. Circuit has construed Boumediene narrowly and in the Government's favor. 375 Indeed, many of the Circuit's judges have openly criticized Boumediene and the Supreme Court's failure to "assume direct responsibility for [its] . . . consequences." 376 Al Maqaleh fits within this trend of retrenchment following Boumediene. By interpreting the three-factor test formalistically, and often rigidly, the D.C. Circuit has effectively limited Boumediene's holding to the singular situation at Guantanamo. It appears from its reasoning in Al Maqaleh II and Al Maqaleh IV that the writ of habeas corpus will not extend to any detention facility outside U.S. sovereign control, nor to any facility located in an active theater of war. If sovereignty is sine qua non to writ jurisdiction, and practical obstacles operate as a de facto political question doctrine, then the practical, functional approach in Boumediene has been lost. 377 By choosing to view the extension of habeas to Bagram in all-ornothing terms, the D.C. Circuit essentially predetermined the result in Al Maqaleh. The D.C. Circuit determined it was unfeasible to ex-and (2) the Government concedes that there are no serious practical obstacles to the exercise of the writ. The upshot is that the Executive can easily evade habeas jurisdiction under the D.C. Circuit's framework. In a future conflict, the Executive could simply house detainees close to hostilities or in a facility under a short-term lease agreement to avoid judicial review of its detention policies. Thus, the Executive would effectively be empowered to "switch the Constitution on or off at will." 385
